The Law vs. the Truth: Conclusion

The Final Chapter of my Forthcoming e-Book on the Manchester Arena Incident

I am in the process of turning my Manchester series into an e-book, intended to complement the books of Richard D. Hall and Iain Davis on the subject.

Because there are thousands of hyperlinks in my series — too many to turn into references for a print version — I intend to release the book in digital format only.

Because it will effectively be two books in one — one on the Richard D. Hall trial, the other on the evidence relating to the Manchester Arena incident — the new book will be around 50% longer than “Covid-19,” Psychological Operations, and the War for Technocracy, Volume 1, and over twice the length of Wall Street, the Nazis, and the Crimes of the Deep State. It is over 500 pages long, or 163,000 words.

Nevertheless, I intend to sell it at a reasonable price to promote its circulation. The original series will remain available to read for free on my Substack.

I have painstakingly edited all 20 parts of the series (chapters in the book) over the course of several months, and have just written an overall conclusion to cap it all off. I ran out of steam for the conclusion back in March 2025, but it is done now and can be read below.

With the conclusion, there will be 21 chapters in total — not 22, as Nick Kollerstrom mischievously suggested. Rest assured, this number has been arrived at entirely by chance!

If anyone with the required skillset is willing to volunteer to help with the artwork for the front cover, I would be keen to hear from them.

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Part 21 - Conclusion

Richard D. Hall was persecuted by the British State for daring to conduct real investigative journalism into the Manchester Arena incident. His trial was clearly instigated by the Establishment, with the BBC leading the way. Martin Hibbert served as an entirely unconvincing vehicle through which to wage lawfare, and the High Court of Justice delivered a preposterous judgment against Hall that makes a mockery of the British legal system.

The point of the verdict against Hall, which he was not allowed to appeal, was to:

• reinforce the official account of the Manchester Arena incident and close down critical inquiry into it;

• intimidate investigative journalists into ignoring high-level criminal malfeasance within state institutions; and

• pave the way for new legislation, such as Eve’s Law, which will allow even those of modest means to sue those who ask critical questions about suspected false flag terrorism events for harassment.

Judging by the woeful state of the so-called “alternative media” in the UK, the verdict has largely served its purpose so far (see Chapter 8), notwithstanding the contributions of Pighooey and the towering defence of Hall mounted by Iain Davis.

In light of everything we have learned about the Manchester Arena incident over the course of this book, which thoroughly vindicates Hall, let us revisit the disgraceful way Hall has been hung out to dry by the Establishment.

Who Instigated the Claim Against Hall?

At the summary judgment hearing, Hall expressed “grave concerns about the motivation for the claim [against him] and, indeed, about whether the Claimants are the real instigators of the claim.”

His concerns were demonstrably justified, when one considers the timeline of events presented in his Summary of Evidence:

Here we see that Hibbert became aware of Hall in July 2021 at the latest, when GMP visited his ex-wife’s house making inquiries about Hall. Nevertheless, Hibbert left it 17 months, until December 22, 2022, to take legal action against Hall.

Steyn, in her Judgment, uncritically accepts that “Mr Hibbert chose to delay bring proceedings until after he had returned from scaling Mount Kilimanjaro, as he did not feel able to focus on bringing litigation until then” [229].

However, the pictures from the BBC’s article on Hibbert reaching the summit of Kilimanjaro on June 13, 2022, suggest that he was mostly carried up the mountain by a team of local men, as one would expect of someone in a wheelchair attempting such a challenge. Therefore, it is unclear what exactly was taking up so much of his focus for the preceding 11 months, or why it took him a further five months to begin litigation.

A more likely explanation of Hibbert’s 17-month delay is given in Hall’s timeline. The BBC’s Marianna Spring began her harassment of Hall on August 10, 2022, which she maintained for a further two months, before the BBC escalated matters with its “Disaster Trolls” propaganda and its actions to get Hall’s YouTube channel terminated and his market stall closed down. One month later, with public opinion having wickedly been turned against Hall by the BBC, Hibbert began his legal action.

In BBC Radio 4’s “Disaster Trolls Remember my name,” Spring states that she “first met Martin [Hibbert] back in the summer of 2022.” Thus, she presumably contacted Hibbert around the same time as she contacted Hall, and for the same purpose, i.e., to stitch Hall up.

It should be obvious to any critical observer that Hibbert did not instigate his claim against Hall independently. Rather, he was a pawn in a premeditated attack on Hall by the State, led by its propaganda arm, the BBC.

In December 2022, while beginning his legal action, Hibbert was also involved with the Mayor of Manchester, Andy Burnham, in pushing for the criminalisation of critical debate and discussion of official narratives, in particular relating to terrorist attacks and atrocities (see Chapter 8). This is further evidence that his action was politically motivated.

Hall replied to the claimants’ “letter before claim,” offering to take reasonable measures to mitigate their concerns (see Chapter 7). Yet, not only did the claimants fail to respond, but the BBC resumed its attacks in March/April 2023. Marianna Spring knew on March 31, 2023, that the claimants would be proceeding with their legal action against Hall, yet Hall only received formal confirmation of this on May 4, 2023 — fully five weeks later.

Therefore, it is hard to disagree with Hall that “it is the BBC who are the proponents of the claim, and may be using the claimant as part of a politically motivated campaign” [3.0].

Following the publication of the Judgment against Hall on October 23, 2024, it took the BBC a mere 11 minutes to publish its article titled “Arena bomb survivors win conspiracy harassment case.” Obviously, the article had already been written before the verdict was announced.

Why the High Court of Justice?

Officially, the High Court of Justice “deals at first instance with all high value and high importance civil law (non-criminal) cases.” According to the UK Government, the King’s Bench Division of the High Court, which handled Hall’s case, usually handles:

• larger and more complex cases worth over £100,000

• personal injury and clinical negligence cases worth £50,000 or more

• defamation cases worth any amount

Therefore, in terms of “high value,” the only reason that this case could be brought before the High Court was that the claimants were seeking damages of “up to or not more than £50,000.” That is the precise amount necessary to meet the £50,000 threshold above, suggesting it was deliberately chosen to facilitate a High Court trial.

Hall’s barrister Paul Oakley pointed out several reasons why the case should not have reached the High Court, i.e.,

• the unnecessary costs of proceedings;

• the fact that alternative dispute mechanisms were not explored and that Hudgell Solicitors had not informed Eve’s parents of those mechanisms;

• the fact that the GDPR element could have been dealt with administratively by the information commissioner but was not; and,

• given that the case was about invasion of privacy, why draw so much attention through a High Court trial with the attendant media circus?

If indeed the case needed to come to trial in the first place, Oakley argued, a county court would have been appropriate. So, there is something suspicious about this case reaching the High Court.

Apart from qualifying as “high value,” Hall’s case may also have been deemed a “high importance civil law” case, since no harassment claim against a media entity had ever previously succeeded at trial in the UK [162]. We may, therefore, surmise that a High Court ruling was needed to set a precedent.

As Hall submitted to the Court in June 2023, “This case amounts to censorship or, rather, an attempt at it, via the High Court of Justice.” As such, it constitutes “an abuse of process of the Court and should be struck out.” Indeed, the case should never have made it to trial.

But it did, and it established a dangerous precedent. Lawfare is defined as “the use of legal action to cause problems for an opponent.” Or in Davis’ terms, “It is the illegitimate use of claimed legal authority to persecute and punish those who challenge power.” That is exactly what we are seeing here.

Why Was Hibbert Willing To Risk So Much?

We know from the fact that Hall was ordered to pay £234,000, covering 90% of the claimants’ costs, that those costs were £260,000.

How many private individuals have £260,000 to risk on a court case that could potentially be lost? In the event of defeat, the defendant’s costs plus any damages would also have to be paid, for a potential total loss of over £500,000 (assuming that the Defence incurred the same costs as the Prosecution)?

Even though they won, the claimants still had to pay £26,000 in costs, meaning that they “only” walked away with £45,000 in damages minus £26,000 in costs = £19,000, or £9,500 each. Even in the best case scenario, they would have walked away with £50,000. Was this really worth risking £500,000+ (or at the very least, £260,000) for? However “principled” Hibbert may claim to be, this is a dreadful risk-reward ratio, and a huge sum of money to be risking if victory were not pre-ordained.

Regardless of how wealthy Hibbert may or may not be, we must remember that Hall was being sued in his capacity as an “independent journalist and broadcaster” [2] and that “No claim of harassment against a media organisation [had ever previously] succeeded at trial” [162]. Therefore, prima facie, the claimants had almost no chance of winning.

What if Hall had won the case? Would Eve Hibbert, as one of the co-claimants, have been on the hook for half of Hall’s costs? Would that have been fair to Eve, given that she played no role herself in bringing the trial or participating in it? Inevitably, the trial would draw public attention to both claimants, only exacerbating the alleged privacy concerns around Eve. A victory for Hall would also have seriously damaged Hibbert’s reputation, on which he trades in, say, his work for the Spinal Injuries Association.

In sum, given the huge legal costs involved, the considerable risk of losing, the potential impact on Eve, the foreseeable publicity that the case would generate, and the risk to Hibbert’s reputation, it is hard to believe that it was Hibbert’s decision to bring this case to trial at the High Court.

More likely is that whoever stumped up the money knew from the outset that Hall was going to lose. Which implies conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.

The quality of Hibbert’s character can be gauged from the fact that, not content with victory and its implications for Hall and his 10-year-old son (i.e., likely bankruptcy and losing the family home), he maliciously attacked Hall on a daily basis for weeks on X after Hall was refused permission to appeal.

The Role of Hudgell Solicitors

The N235 form confirming Hibbert’s ex-wife Sarah Gillbard’s suitability to be a litigation friend for his daughter, Eve, was dated March 31, 2023, indicating that Gillbard had been what Hall’s barrister, Paul Oakley, called a “party by proxy” for over 15 months before the trial.

Yet, it emerged during the trial that Gillbard had seen neither the pre-action protocol letter dated December 22, 2022, nor the claim form issued on April 17, 2023:

Mr Oakley: [...] In the course of her live evidence, Sarah Gillbard confirmed that she had seen neither letter, and I was quite astonished by that so double checked and asked if she was sure to which she replied:

“Yeah.”

Nor had Gillbard seen Hall’s reply to the pre-action protocol letter, dated January 11, 2023, in which Hall set out some proposed remedies to narrow the differences between the two parties (see Chapter 7).

As Davis notes, this means that one of the two claimants (Gillbard on behalf of Eve) seems to have played no role in notifying Hall of the intended prosecution, and had no idea what Hall’s position was before agreeing to proceed to trial. How could that be?

Oakley told Steyn that it was “gravely astonishing that the solicitors for the Claimants did not direct Sarah Gillbard to the essential correspondence in this matter.”

If the claimants were unsatisfied with Hall’s reply to the pre-action protocol letter, they should have taken matters further by complaining to the Information Commissioner under the Data Protection Act.

But neither of them was aware of that possibility, again because of Hudgell’s:

Mr Oakley: And if you had a substantive complaint it would [...] probably have been dealt with by now by the Information Commissioner without having to come to court and incur massive costs for lawyers and seek damages of £50,000. If that was your real concern you could have sorted it out with a complaint to the Information Commissioner could you not?

Mr Hibbert: Well I do not know that because I was not aware of it, you know, after speaking to my legal team that I know and trust.

Hudgell’s failure to make their client aware of that fundamental information again contributed to the case coming to court unnecessarily.

Once the case reached the High Court, it was Hudgell’s Manager Terry Wilcox who confirmed he had seen the CCTV images of the claimants at 20:03 and 22:30, in a witness statement which both Davison and Steyn accepted as reliable evidence despite the obvious conflict of interest involved (see Parts 3 and 6).

In sum, Hudgell Solicitors appears to have been a central cog in the conspiracy against Hall.

None of the information contained in this section was mentioned in the relevant section of the Judgment (on procedural history) [37-44].

Instances of Bias in the Legal Proceedings

As we saw in Chapters 3-8, there was no fair trial of Richard D. Hall. The Summary Judgment prohibited Hall from presenting vital evidence at trial, which would have cast doubt on Hibbert’s claims regarding when, where, and how he and Eve sustained their injuries (Chapter 3).

The “harassment” charge was patently ridiculous, given that Hall had never met, tried to meet, or had any successful communication with the claimants (Chapter 4). Instead, it had to be channeled into the category of “harassment by publication.”

The “abuse of media freedom” charge was equally absurd, given that Hall did nothing wrong in terms of journalistic conduct, and certainly nothing remotely approaching the abuses of media freedom conducted by the BBC and other mainstream media organs (Chapter 5).

The High Court relied entirely on appeals to authority, while excluding and obfuscating the most important primary empirical evidence, in its persecution of Hall (Chapter 6).

It found, against all evidence to the contrary, that Hibbert was “undoubtedly an honest witness” [62] and that the claimants had suffered anxiety and distress as a result of Hall’s actions. As argued in Chapter 7, nothing could be further from the truth.

Given that the Hall trial was patently not about justice, what was it really about? Fundamentally, it was about disciplining the independent media in the UK (Chapter 8). The Judgment serves as a sign of intent that the State is willing to use lawfare, egregiously if necessary, to attack any independent journalist who comes too close to exposing covert state crime.

Yet, despite the entire weight of the British Establishment being thrown against Hall, it is clear that Hall’s robust defence came as a surprise, indeed a shock, to those arrayed against him. Again, Davis is right that, “from the Establishment’s perspective, the trial was a debacle as a result.” It has laid bare all kinds of information that, from the Establishment’s perspective, would have best stayed hidden.

Costs and Damages

In Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2002] EWCA Civ 1871, the Court of Appeal handed down guidance on the quantification of damages for harassment in the workplace, as distinct from compensation for psychiatric or similar personal injury. That guidance is now commonly referred to as the Vento bands.

It is unclear whether the Vento bands should be higher or lower than for non-workplace-related claims, but it is reasonable to assume that they would be lower than for the kind of harassment that was alleged by Martin and Eve Hibbert in relation to a terrorist attack.

On April 6, 2024, the Vento Bands were increased by the Presidents of the Employment Tribunals in England and Wales, and Scotland as follows:

• Lower band, Less serious cases: £1,200 - £11,700 (increasing from £1,100 - £11,200)

• Middle band: £11,700 - £35,200 (increasing from £11,200 - £33,700)

• Upper band: £35,200 to £58,700 (increasing from £33,700 - £56,200)

• In the most exceptional cases: excess of £58,700

So, despite Hall having been found guilty of “oppressive and unacceptable” behaviour [188], worse than anything ever done before by any British media entity [162], Steyn’s award of £22,500 per claimant ranks in the middle of the middle Vento band, i.e. average as far as even workplace harassment compensation payments go.

Why was this exceptional case – the first successful harassment claim ever brought against a UK media entity [162] – not deemed worthy of damages in excess of £58,700 per claimant?

Prosection barrister Price proposed “a total of £75,000 for the pair in damages,” which is £37,500 each. Oakley countered that £7,500 each in damages would be appropriate, given that there was no justification for aggravated damages because of the lack of alleged malice.

At any rate, the damages awarded should surely have been higher if the charges against Hall were really as serious as alleged. The fact that the damages were mediocre reads as a tacit admission that Hall’s behaviour was not exceptionally bad after all.

The £234,000 in legal costs for an unnecessary High Court trial, plus £45,000 in damages, may still prove enough to bankrupt him, however.

And For What?

What, ultimately, is the point of the British State’s persecution of Richard D. Hall? Why go to such extreme lengths to scapegoat one man?

In the final analysis, the evidence presented in this book strongly suggests that Hall was persecuted for shining light on a deep state power structure so dark and so nefarious that few people would believe it to be possible.

To see that, let us recap the findings of Part 2 of this book.

The emergency service response looks like a coordinated stand down which could only have been orchestrated by the intelligence agencies and implemented through the relevant command structures (Chapter 9).

The fingerprints of MI5 and Counter Terrorism Policing are not difficult to detect across multiple aspects of the Manchester Arena incident, including potential operatives on the night (Chapters 10 and 11).

The police investigation, Operation Manteline, appears to have doctored certain evidence, covered up other evidence, changed witness statements, and provided a highly misleading narrative to the Inquiry based on “Sequences of Events” formed around cherry-picked CCTV images (Chapter 12).

The Inquiry was anything but a “full, fair and fearless” investigation of the circumstances that led to the deaths of 22 people, as Saunders promised it would be [33]. Instead, it proved to be a whitewash that kept the most important primary empirical evidence at arm’s length and worked to rubber-stamp a pre-determined narrative (Chapter 13).

Despite its mandate to “investigate how, and in what circumstances, 22 people came to lose their lives in the attack at the Manchester Arena on 22 May 2017,” the Inquiry failed to specify where exactly each of the 22 named fatalities was located within the City Room. Primary empirical evidence does not support the official claim that there were 58 seriously injured people in the City Room, or that Salman Abedi blew himself up (Chapter 14).

A statistically insignificant number of casualties can be found for whom injury detail is provided in the Inquiry report. The public has seen no primary empirical evidence to confirm those injuries, only a narrative based on interlocking witness testimonies. A TATP shrapnel bomb detonated in the middle of a room containing hundreds of people would, by the logic of the Inquiry’s “Blast Wave Panel of Experts,” have caused far more injuries than were reported, and in most cases would have been much more severe (Chapter 15).

Evidence of active bleeding and pools of blood is extremely difficult to find, despite legacy media reports of the event having been a bloodbath. At most, there were a few faint “blood” trails on CCTV, plus evidence of certain casualties appearing to bleed through clothing. Yet, barely anyone seems to have witnessed an active bleed, and even the witness testimonies in relation to John Atkinson, who officially bled to death, raise more questions than answers (Chapter 16).

The Inquiry heard evidence from relatively few “survivors” and accepted at face value any and every claim made by them, no matter how implausible. It offered scant indication of where those “survivors” were at the moment of detonation. Suspiciously, only six “survivors” out of dozens named can be seen on 806 publicly available CCTV images. Instead, certain “survivors” were much more visible in the media afterwards, reinforcing “War on Terror” propaganda about the supposed ever-present danger of terrorism (Chapter 17).

The “survivors’” testimonies to the Inquiry appeared scripted and generally unconvincing. There were some peculiar commonalities among their testimonies that one would not expect to find, such as lack of pain/panic, highly unlikely physical feats, and a miraculous cheating of death. Ruth Murrell was not called to give evidence at the Inquiry, perhaps because her account is starkly at odds with multiple pieces of primary empirical evidence that show her (Chapter 18).

Evidence of medical treatment being administered to scores of casualties is hard to find. Most first responders were not trained to deliver such treatment. Only three paramedics entered the City Room, and they appear only to have triaged (not treated) patients. Defibrillators were not used to shock anyone. Supposedly seriously injured people were recklessly placed on metal barrier and trestle tables and carried precariously along a footbridge and down two flights of stairs. Although there is strong witness evidence available in relation to the treatment of Atkinson, Callander, and Roussos, those three cases do not serve as a representative cross-section of the casualties, and there is no primary empirical evidence in the public domain to support the witness accounts (Chapter 19).

It is hard to find any evidence of casualties receiving medical treatment at the Casualty Clearing Station (CCS). Instead, casualties were left to lie on the cold floor for over two hours on average, with the average arrival time at hospital being over three hours post-detonation. P1 and P2 patients could have died during that time, and ambulances were waiting outside, so why the long delay? Freya Lewis and Ruth Murrell mysteriously disappeared long before their ambulances departed for hospital. The Inquiry evidently tried to conceal the identities of those taken to the CCS, even though 25 of the 38 can nevertheless be identified from Inquiry documents. Why does the public still not know the identities of the other 11? Was every casualty who is said to have been there actually there?

The Penetration of All Major Institutions by the Transnational Deep State

If we put all of this evidence together, the sinister truth which emerges is that the transnational deep state has penetrated every major institution involved in the Manchester Arena incident. This includes:

• all the emergency services, through their command structures;

• the security services and Counter-Terrorism policing;

• the police investigation;

• the public inquiry;

• the legacy media with its relentless deceitful propaganda;

• the Government, whence the official narrative emanates; and

• the High Court of Justice, with its unjust persecution of Hall.

By extension, it is reasonable to infer that the transnational deep state has captured every major institution in British society, and indeed transnationally.

The vast majority of employees of those institutions are not knowingly complicit in deep state agendas. They simply do their job, perhaps believing that the institutions they work for are venerable.

All of this gives the lie to the notion that Western societies function as democracies in any fundamental sense.

Granted, in the ordinary course of events, democracy is allowed to function as usual.

But when it comes to what Peter Dale Scott calls “deep structural events,” such as the Manchester Arena incident, which are used to reengineer society at a fundamental level — in this case, by maintaining the illusion that terrorism poses an existential threat, justifying ever more draconian legislation to counter it — the reality is that a coterie of vested interests is using its power to try to subjugate the rest of society. This typically involves highly deceptive means and a willingness to go after those who are exposing the lies.

Three years before the “Covid-19” operation, in which the transnational coordination of all major institutions against the public became painfully obvious to those not blinded by propaganda, the writing was already on the wall with the Manchester Arena incident.

But almost no one was paying attention. For a brief time, there was the pseudonymous UK Critical Thinker, but only one man dared to publish a book and a film pulling together all the information that was in the public domain at the time. The persecution of Richard D. Hall was intended to dissuade others from tugging on the same threads and exposing the horrifying truth about how Western societies are really run.

Will the Victimisation of Hall Backfire?

Hall finishes Manchester on Trial by correctly anticipating that, as the only journalist to have done the necessary investigation, he will be “shut up” (via an injunction), and he therefore encourages others to share the primary empirical evidence relating to the case.

Although most of the so-called “alternative media” has lamely sided with the State against Hall since he was found guilty of a crime he did not commit (see Chapter 8), his case has, nevertheless, generated a large amount of publicity. At least four commentators (Iain Davis, Pighooey, Nick Kollerstrom, and myself) have written in defence of Hall. In fact, Davis and I have written entire books in Hall’s defence.

This new literature, which broadens and deepens Hall’s investigation, and reflects on the broader power dynamics at work, would not have arisen had Hall been left to his own devices.

Remember, Hall tried to do the right thing, on the system’s own terms. As his barrister noted in his closing remarks:

Mr Oakley: So, there are questions to be answered, and indeed what did Mr Hall do after he finished his book? He sent it to the inquiry. He was obviously hoping that the inquiry would look into the questions that he raises and reach conclusions. He is maybe not the person to give the answers but […] it is certainly appropriate for him to ask the questions, but there was no response. And on top of that, the questions that he has asked still have not been answered […]

The lack of answers to Hall’s evidence-based questions following a three-year inquiry is indicative that the Inquiry was a whitewash. The Inquiry was consistently unwilling to examine primary empirical evidence in a transparent fashion.

It was not Hall’s fault that Saunders ignored his evidence, or that the British State chose to persecute him, first through the BBC and then a through a succession of High Court judges whose reasoning was deeply suspect (see Chapters 3-8).

Had those actions not been taken against him, it is likely that Hall, who had published no new material on Manchester since June 2020 and had turned his attention to other matters, such as “vaccine” contents, would not have produced Manchester on Trial, Manchester on Camera, and Table for Two. Yet, here is even more evidence in relation to the Manchester Arena incident.

Paradoxically, as Hall pointed out in Manchester on Trial, although the Inquiry was meant to cement the official narrative, it ended up putting a “treasure trove” of new evidence into the public domain. Much of the most powerful evidence, for example, is the CCTV imagery that was released. Coupled with over 1,300 hours of witness testimony, all transcribed, there is now more evidence available than even Hall, Davis, Pighooey, and I, between us, have been able to analyse. No wonder that evidence has been made so difficult for the public to locate.

Those wanting to know the truth about the Manchester Arena incident need to go through that evidence for themselves. Or at the very least download it all before it is memory-holed.

The high cost of mounting a legal defence in a High Court case was evidently intended to make Hall admit wrongdoing without going to court. As Davis surmises, “having instigated legal action, they anticipated Hall would be forced to offer some sort of public retraction and accept liability.”

Yet, because Hall’s cause was just, the public contributed the funds needed to pay for his legal defence. This was clearly unanticipated by his opponents.

Furthermore, Hall fought the good fight in court, as evidenced by the transcripts for the summary judgment hearing and the main trial. In the process, he helped to expose the corruption in the legal proceedings. On the evidence of this case, we are looking at a legal system that, as Davis observes, is “neither fair nor just and serves only to protect and serve the government and other powerful interests.”

In sum, an enormous amount of evidence is now available for public inspection — not only Hall’s work (including his original Book and Film, plus Manchester on Trial, Manchester on Camera, and Table for Two), but also the Inquiry reports, the Inquiry hearings, the Inquiry transcripts, the Summary Judgment against Hall, the final Judgment against Hall, and the transcripts for the summary judgment hearing and the main trial.

There is also the work of Iain Davis, Pighooey, and myself. Davis and I have jointly given two interview presentations (to Maryann Gebauer and Paul Hellier), lasting over three hours each, which are saturated with the key evidence.

Therefore, despite attempts to shut down investigation into the Manchester Arena incident, it is now easier than ever before for real investigative journalists and other genuine truth-seekers to conduct their own investigations into the matter.

Given the political significance of the incident, and the way it is being used to legitimise increasingly oppressive measures against the public, it is imperative that the truth comes to light and is made known to a large audience. This is the challenge that lies before us.

What can you do to help? The last word belongs with Hall (2018, 10:50): “As long as you oppose tyranny and corruption in whatever way you see fit, that’s good enough for me.”