I appreciate the effort you are putting into this to get to the truth of the matter. It cannot have been easy to research and assemble this account of the interactions - or mainly lack of useful ones - between the emergency services. I can only agree that it stretches the imagination to believe that these failures were all just a series of unhappy coincidences. Rather, it was very essential to strictly control the people who were allowed to enter the City Room and see that scene for themselves. A question in my mind, and I know this is not the topic of the article, but how did they handle the ‘evacuation’ of the ‘victims’ and their subsequent ‘hospital treatment’? This would also have required quite some level of deception.
Yes, this particular article was a lot of work, but necessary if we are to understand how exactly the emergency response failed. Serious failures at every point of every command chain cannot be a coincidence in my view.
It shows what appears to be an earnest attempt by at least 40 or so people to transport victims down the steps to the Casualty Clearing Station. It appears, especially from the urgency with which those people run back up the steps afterwards, that they believe the casualties to be genuine. They did not realise they were being filmed.
So either:
- Some people were genuinely injured (but not by a TATP shrapnel bomb)
- A lot of first responders were fooled (e.g. Showsec and BTP staff with no medical expertise)
- It was a remarkably convincing drill
Or a combination of some/all of the above. It's not straightforward to get to the bottom of.
As for the hospital treatment, medical records are confidential, and I'm not aware of any hard evidence in the public domain that any of those people actually reached hospital, or what happened to them if/when they did. There are just reports (including the Inquiry report).
In Part 7 I discussed the only piece of medical evidence that came out in relation to Martin Hibbert, and it turned out there was a 70-minute discrepancy between when he officially arrived at Salford Royal and when his consultant claimed he did. Hibbert claimed to have had a severed artery, in which case, from what I have read, he would have bled out in 5-10 minutes, yet somehow with his 22 shrapnel wounds he survived for over two hours before reaching hospital. So there is at least some reason for scepticism when it comes to medical matters.
I recall an axiom : why suspect malfeasance when incompetence explains so much?
Surely some of those involved in what were clearly questionable decisions, at best, were the subjects of internal inquiry? And, given the numbers in play, were any disciplined?
Indeed. "Why suspect a conspiracy when a cock-up usually explains things?" is commonly heard.
I have been careful here not to point the finger at any specific individual, merely to piece together what the Inquiry report has to say about them all.
But the thing to notice is not so much individual behaviour as the pattern that emerges: serious failures across Gold, Silver, and Bronze command levels in all four services. I'm not sure incompetence explains that. If it does, then the implication is that the emergency services are basically unfit for purpose, which I do not believe to be the case.
I have not looked into internal inquiries and disciplining - that is a very good point you make.
However, I did notice that at least of some of the above figures were promoted between May 2017 and their appearance at the Inquiry, which is consistent with the idea of "failing up," or being rewarded for failure.
Barnes received the Queen's Ambulance Medal as part of the Queen's Birthday Honours 2018. According to NWAS, he was a man of "exemplary ability, conduct and devotion." https://x.com/NWAmbulance/status/1062455161883369472
I appreciate the effort you are putting into this to get to the truth of the matter. It cannot have been easy to research and assemble this account of the interactions - or mainly lack of useful ones - between the emergency services. I can only agree that it stretches the imagination to believe that these failures were all just a series of unhappy coincidences. Rather, it was very essential to strictly control the people who were allowed to enter the City Room and see that scene for themselves. A question in my mind, and I know this is not the topic of the article, but how did they handle the ‘evacuation’ of the ‘victims’ and their subsequent ‘hospital treatment’? This would also have required quite some level of deception.
Thanks, Howard.
Yes, this particular article was a lot of work, but necessary if we are to understand how exactly the emergency response failed. Serious failures at every point of every command chain cannot be a coincidence in my view.
I, too, wonder about the evacuation and hospital treatment of victims. You can watch some of the evacuation here: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4531940/Emergency-services-rush-Manchester-Arena.html#v-835423685341694178
It shows what appears to be an earnest attempt by at least 40 or so people to transport victims down the steps to the Casualty Clearing Station. It appears, especially from the urgency with which those people run back up the steps afterwards, that they believe the casualties to be genuine. They did not realise they were being filmed.
So either:
- Some people were genuinely injured (but not by a TATP shrapnel bomb)
- A lot of first responders were fooled (e.g. Showsec and BTP staff with no medical expertise)
- It was a remarkably convincing drill
Or a combination of some/all of the above. It's not straightforward to get to the bottom of.
As for the hospital treatment, medical records are confidential, and I'm not aware of any hard evidence in the public domain that any of those people actually reached hospital, or what happened to them if/when they did. There are just reports (including the Inquiry report).
In Part 7 I discussed the only piece of medical evidence that came out in relation to Martin Hibbert, and it turned out there was a 70-minute discrepancy between when he officially arrived at Salford Royal and when his consultant claimed he did. Hibbert claimed to have had a severed artery, in which case, from what I have read, he would have bled out in 5-10 minutes, yet somehow with his 22 shrapnel wounds he survived for over two hours before reaching hospital. So there is at least some reason for scepticism when it comes to medical matters.
But there is a lot we still don't know.
I recall an axiom : why suspect malfeasance when incompetence explains so much?
Surely some of those involved in what were clearly questionable decisions, at best, were the subjects of internal inquiry? And, given the numbers in play, were any disciplined?
And if not why not?
Indeed. "Why suspect a conspiracy when a cock-up usually explains things?" is commonly heard.
I have been careful here not to point the finger at any specific individual, merely to piece together what the Inquiry report has to say about them all.
But the thing to notice is not so much individual behaviour as the pattern that emerges: serious failures across Gold, Silver, and Bronze command levels in all four services. I'm not sure incompetence explains that. If it does, then the implication is that the emergency services are basically unfit for purpose, which I do not believe to be the case.
I have not looked into internal inquiries and disciplining - that is a very good point you make.
However, I did notice that at least of some of the above figures were promoted between May 2017 and their appearance at the Inquiry, which is consistent with the idea of "failing up," or being rewarded for failure.
A real give-away would be if Barnes was ‘rewarded’ for his TV watching, but perhaps that would be just too obvious.
Barnes received the Queen's Ambulance Medal as part of the Queen's Birthday Honours 2018. According to NWAS, he was a man of "exemplary ability, conduct and devotion." https://x.com/NWAmbulance/status/1062455161883369472