The Law vs. The Truth: Getting to the Bottom of the Richard D. Hall Case

Part 10 - National Security and Counter Terrorism

Part 10 - National Security and Counter Terrorism

This is the tenth article in a series on the Richard D. Hall case. If you have not already done so, you should begin at Part 1 and work your way forwards, as each part builds on the last.

Introduction

So far, in this series, I have argued that:

• Richard D. Hall’s evidence regarding the Manchester Arena incident discredits the official account;

• the British state has unjustly waged lawfare against Hall to stop awareness of this from spreading; and

• we are now reaching what Iain Davis calls the “sharp end” of the attempted shut down of free speech in relation to politically sensitive topics.

Part 9 explored the unbelievable failures in the emergency response to the alleged terrorist attack on May 22, 2017. One need not point fingers at individuals to see that serious across-the-board failures, at every level of command (Gold, Silver, and Bronze), for all four emergency services, cannot be accidental.

A more parsimonious explanation is that key individuals were ordered to stand down by MI5 and placed under the Official Secrets Act.

This brings us to the role of the security services. Hall proposes the following schema for how the security services may have ran the Manchester Arena operation:

(1:01:24)

Here, we see that a “national covert intelligence agency,” which I suspect is MI5, exerts several key levers of control:

• it intervenes in the emergency services response;

• through local Counter Terrorism personnel (Liz Forster and Ken Upham), it recruits key Arena staff from Showsec and ETUK; it places certain operatives on the night (see Part 11); and it controls Operation Manteline;

• it manipulates the Inquiry (a topic to which I will return in Part 12);

• perhaps most controversially, it arranges crisis actors (a topic to which I will return in Part 13); and

• it makes sure that the mainstream/legacy media reports the version of events which it wants the public to believe.

The reason why I suspect that the “national covert intelligence agency” posited by Hall is MI5 is because MI5 is referred to as “the Security Service” by Saunders in Volume 3 of the Inquiry report (§24.5). There are 191 mentions of “the Security Service” in that volume but only a few mentions of MI5 (excluding “Witness J” from MI5). Thus, Saunders apparently wants to downplay the fact that he is referring to MI5, even though, presumably, he had to make clear, at least once in 226 pages, that he was doing precisely that.

The Inquiry report recognises that MI5 and Counter Terrorism Policing are essentially two sides of the same coin:

While the Security Service and Counter Terrorism Policing have different roles and expertise, they work very closely together in pursuit of the common goal of countering the terrorism threat in the UK. This is predominantly through the national Counter Terrorism Policing network, Metropolitan Police Service and Police Service of Northern Ireland. (§24.36)

The relevant Counter Terrorism organisation in the Manchester case is Counter Terrorism Policing North West (CTPNW), which in May 2017 was known as North West Counter Terrorism Unit (NWCTU); it “works very closely” with the NorthWest regional station of MI5 (§24.13).

Liz Forster and Ken Upham

Liz Forster identified herself in her second witness statement as “Principal Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA) based within Counter Terrorism Policing North West (CTPNW).” She would, therefore, have worked very closely with MI5. Her first witness statement appears to be unavailable in the National Archives, and she receives only three brief mentions in the Inquiry report.

Ken Upham was line managed by Forster. Upham described himself in his three witness statements as “Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA) based within Counter Terrorism Policing North West (CTPNW).” Upham did not give evidence to the Inquiry in person owing to ill health (§4.22).

Instead, Upham provided three written witness statements, which can be found here, here, and here. Although the last of those witness statements is dated July 6, 2020, and Volume 1 of the Inquiry report was not published until June 17, 2021, he was not rescheduled to appear at the Inquiry. Thus, he and Forster received scant attention from Saunders.

Saunders makes no criticism of Upham in the Inquiry report. Instead, he focuses on relatively trivial details, such as the fact that information passed to Upham by SMG Event Manager Miriam Stone overestimated the coverage of the CCTV and the quality of bag searches (§4.24, §4.26).

Saunders finds that Upham

did not concern himself with advising what security measures were required to protect against an attack by a PBIED [person-borne improvised explosive device] in the City Room, particularly during egress or ingress (§4.26).

Forster, too, was only “concerned with safety in the Arena itself” (§4.27). The idea is, thus, that an attack in the City Room was not foreseen.

Yet, other witnesses told the Inquiry that Upham had repeatedly used the phrase “If an attack is going to happen, it’s going to happen,” specifically in relation to the City Room [1:11:27]. Why, then, did Upham “not consider that it was part of his role to consider the security in the City Room as a whole” (§4.23)?

According to Hall, Upham organised several terror exercises at the Manchester Arena leading up to May 22, 2017 (§4.11; 1:10:00). It was commented on in witness testimony at the Inquiry that he was spending more time at the Arena than usual, and that he was visiting the Arena without any formal communication (§4.11).

It would have been important for the Inquiry to hear from Upham about those terror exercises and why he was making additional unannounced visits to the Arena.

Despite making those extra visits, Upham did not attend an actual event to see security protocols in action (§4.31). So, what was the purpose of those visits?

If Hall is correct, Liz Forster and Ken Upham may be two of the most important names in relation to the Manchester Arena incident that no one has ever heard of.

Terror Drills

It has been known since the “9/11 war games” that drills and exercises are very important in false flag terrorism operations. They can be used for preparation purposes, or to cause chaos and distraction (as with the multiple exercises taking place in the skies on September 11, 2001), or can be made to “go live” on the day, i.e., no longer be an exercise, even if not all participants realise this.

Who could forget Peter Power’s words on the day of the July 7, 2005, attacks in London that his crisis management company had been running drills for his client at half past nine that very morning “based on simultaneous bombs going off precisely at the railway stations that happened this morning.” It is statistically impossible that this was a coincidence: the attacks and the exercise must somehow have been related.

Peter Power speaking on July 7, 2005, about his company running exercises that precisely mimicked the attacks in London that day. Source: Bitchute.

Or think of Event 201, which simulated the outbreak of a global coronavirus pandemic just six weeks before the first cases of a simulated global coronavirus pandemic were reported. This was useful for orienting the cadre responsible for the fake pandemic /pseudopandemic of 2020.

With such considerations in mind, we cannot ignore the fact that

SMG [the venue owner] had a programme of exercises created by Miriam Stone of SMG and Thomas Bailey of Showsec. An exercise on 17th December 2014 [in which private first aid suppliers Emergency Training UK also took part] was designed around the scenario of a terrorist attack in the City Room […] This was one of a number of exercises (§16.64).

Thus, as so often seems to be the case with these events, the Manchester Arena incident (an alleged terrorist attack in the City Room) had been pre-rehearsed (or gamed out) in advance. It also turned out, as seems to be the golden rule, that the perpetrator was known to the authorities.

According to the Inquiry report,

There were at least nine [!] further multi-agency exercises in 2016 and 2017 in which GMRF [Greater Manchester Resilience Forum] was involved. These tested different aspects of a multi-agency emergency response, including evacuation plans, disaster victim identification and mass casualty trauma training. Exercise Hawk River in March 2017 was notable as it was focused on the response to a Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack (§12.71).

Assuming this timeline ends in May 2017, this means that Greater Manchester emergency services were jointly conducting exercises in preparation for a mass casualty event every two months, on average, for almost a year and a half before the Manchester Arena incident.

Yet, when that event came, their response was disastrous:

Looked at overall, and objectively, the performance of the emergency services was far below the standard it should have been. GMP did not lead the response in accordance with the guidance that it had been given or parts of its own plans. Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) failed to turn up at the scene at a time when they could provide the greatest assistance. North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) failed to send sufficient paramedics into the City Room. NWAS did not use available stretchers to remove casualties in a safe way, and did not communicate their intentions sufficiently to those who were in the City Room. (p. iv)

This begs the question: were all the training exercises intended to improve the emergency services response, or to find the most effective means of undermining it?

Exercise Winchester Accord

On May 10, 2016 — one year before the Manchester Arena incident — a counter-terror exercise (Exercise Winchester Accord) took place in Manchester involving a mock suicide bomber and large numbers of crisis actors covered in moulage and fake blood, pretending to be injured:

Source: The Independent

A short video of the 2016 Trafford Centre simulation can be found here.

As with “9/11,” “7/7,” and the “pandemic,” the line between a mock exercise and reality got blurred in the case of Manchester.

North West Fire Service (NWFS) was not invited to participate in Exercise Winchester Accord; instead, “the NILO [National Inter-agency Liaison Officer] was given the role to mobilise GMFRS [Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service] to the exercise” (§12.768). A year later, NWFS played no useful role in the response to the incident in the City Room and instead, for no good reason, relied on the NILO to mobilise GMRFS, hindering him along the way (see Part 9).

During Exercise Winchester Accord, a Forward Command Post (FCP) was not communicated by Greater Manchester Police (GMP) to North West Ambulance Service (NWAs) or GMFRS (§12.842-12.843). A year later, a FCP was not even established, let alone communicated to the other emergency services.

In the 2016 simulation, Greater Manchester Police failed to alert the fire and ambulance services that it was safe to approach during a “marauding” terrorist attack. The same failure to communicate an Operation Plato declaration occurred again a year later (see Part 9).

In Exercise Winchester Accord, firefighters and paramedics arrived two hours and 20 minutes late, whereas both “NWAS and GMFRS personnel should have been able to deploy to the Operation Plato warm zone outside of the building within 30 minutes of the attack” (§12.829). A year later, the fire service arrived two hours late, and only three paramedics entered the City Room, two of them 44 minutes after detonation (see Part 9).

During Exercise Winchester Accord, “the FDO [Force Duty Officer] was overstretched and at times impossible to contact” (§12.829). Exactly the same was true of FDO Dale Sexton a year later (see Part 9).

Exercise Winchester Accord was branded a “catastrophic failure” by Pete Weatherby QC, speaking at the Manchester Arena Inquiry in 2021. But was it really? Or, from an intelligence perspective, was it almost ideal preparation for what would take place one year later?

Exercise Winchester Accord appears, ultimately, to have been a military exercise. For example, Superintendent Graeme Openshaw (the Ground Assigned Tactical Firearms Commander for the exercise) told the Inquiry that “he had briefings with the Operational Firearms Commander and a military commander in the CCTV control room” (§12.835, my emphasis). The exercise was ultimately resolved when “the military moved into the Trafford Centre” (§12.839).

This begs the question of whether the Manchester Arena incident was also a military exercise, following in the tradition of NATO’s Operation Gladio.

Was the Manchester Arena Incident an Exercise?

Compare the photograph of crisis actors in Exercise Winchester Accord above to the Parker photograph of the City Room at or around 22:35 on May 22, 2017:

The Parker photograph. Source: Hall (2020, p. 26).

In both cases, we see people lying on the ground. In neither case are there pools of blood on the floor, or blood everywhere, as per media reports of the City Room (see Part 7).

Apart from two red patches on white gauze that has not been wrapped around the presumptive wounds, plus two red lines on the floor that are not visibly connected to any body, there is no obvious suggestion of active bleeding in the Parker photograph. “Wounds” and “blood” are more visible in the Trafford Centre simulation.

One reason for this is that the “victims” in the 2016 simulation were facing towards the camera, whereas those in the Parker photograph all appear to be facing away, as though by design, to conceal their identities.

Note that the man lying centre right in the Parker photograph has no obvious blood on him and is looking at his mobile phone:

Close-up of the Parker photograph.

We know that there are reasons to suspect the involvement of Ruth Morrell (see Part 2). Note that Morrell causally throws a third white blanket/gauze with a red stain on it towards someone close to the camera:

Source: Barr footage

That person appears to have had his right trouser leg cut away and to have lost his shoes and socks within four minutes of detonation, but is still well enough to sit up and reach out for the gauze.

The Barr footage reveals that there was no urgency or panic in first responder activity. No one is seen running, shouting, or gesturing frantically. No one is using a phone to call for help. Instead, people casually stroll around, chat to one another, and/or kneel next to the people on the ground. No one is “making any kind of observable lifesaving or resuscitation effort, such as CPR compressions” (Davis, 2024, p. 278).

Davis contrasts that nonchalant first response with his own experience:

It is anecdotal but, regrettably, I have seen traumatic injury and death at close quarters. I can only tell you that I was barely able to function after witnessing these horrors face-to-face. I also know a police officer who was at the scene of the Harrods’ bombing. Despite his training, the officer’s recollection of his experience was very similar to my own.

In other words, were the carnage commensurate with the effects of a TATP shrapnel bomb being detonated in a crowded room, the first responders would have been deeply traumatised and not acting casually.

On the other hand, if what took place in the City Room were an exercise, as the evidence in Part 2 further indicates, then it was convincing to the untrained eye. For example, ETUK staff, quickly on the scene in their green uniforms, were mistaken for paramedics, not only by PC Richardson in the heat of the moment when he entered the City Room at 22:48 (§13.308-13.309), but also by Mrs Justice Karen Steyn, a High Court judge who farcically claimed the right to decree what really took place there (see Part 6).

Troublingly, the exercises continue. A 2023 joint training exercise by the Greater Manchester emergency services took place at the University of Bolton. According to the BBC, it was

based on terrorists indiscriminately attacking people at the venue with up to 60 volunteers acting as casualties with a wide range of injuries created by the university's special effects students.

GMFRS’ Ben Levy and NWAS’ Daniel Smith, both Bronze Commanders on May 22, 2017, took part in the exercise.

Creating a Controlled Environment

Hall contends that the City Room, on May 22, 2017, was turned into a controlled and managed space:

The arena foyer is an enclosed area, which is not easily visible to people outside, and can be controlled and managed by manning the entrances and exits. I have identified over 100 people who it is claimed were in the foyer at the time of the bang. It seems implausible that not one person took a photograph or video of what happened and managed to post it online. The foyer would provide an ideal space for a controlled terror training exercise, allowing minimum visibility to those that were not contracted to take part. (2020, p. 10)

Indeed, the only photograph and video from inside the City Room that were posted to social media are the Parker photograph and the Barr footage, which have not been officially acknowledged to exist.

Evidence that Access to the City Room was Blocked Before the Bang

We know from three separate witness accounts that access to the doors separating the City Room and the concourse was blocked before the detonation occurred (listen here from 05:11 to 06:21).

According to the first witness account,

We said, let’s go now before the rush, so we walked towards where the MEN [Manchester Evening News] car park is, where we parked, and there was a row of stewards stood in a line, stopping us from getting through, but they were very friendly, and they said this isn’t your best way, girls, you’re best turning round and you can get to your car park that way. As I turned round, BOOM! One loud noise.

According to the second witness account,

We was [sic.] waiting to be let out to walk down to the foyer area and while we was waiting they wouldn’t let us past, and all of a sudden we heard like a massive explosion, and it went quiet, then everyone started screaming and running.

The Mail reported multiple a third eyewitness account as early as 01:43am on May 23, 2017:

Another witness Jenny Brewster told MailOnline: 'We were exiting the building when it happened.

'We'd headed towards the main doors as Ariana was performing the last song because we wanted to beat the crowds, but — as we made our way there — a wall of security men blocked it and told us to go the other way.

'Seconds later they shouted 'RUN!' and the explosion happened right behind them. Hundreds of people were running and screaming […]

Why would “stewards” and “security men” — presumably, but not certainly, Showsec staff — be blocking access from the concourse to the City Room just as the concert was about to end, given that this was one of four main egress routes? It is highly suspicious that this was done moments before the bang occurred.

A map of the auditorium. Closing off one of the four egress routes would have placed significant strain on the other three. Source: Kerslake Report, Figure 3.

Officially, the City Room was Sealed After the Bang

Ignoring the three witness testimonies above, the Kerslake Report states

Within the first few minutes after the explosion, the duty manager instructed Showsec stewards in the Arena bowl to close the aisles nearest to the foyer exit and for the stewards on the concourse to position themselves to divert concert goers in order, as far as possible, to avoid the public having to witness the scenes in the foyer. (§4.20, my emphasis)

If this were true, then in the minutes that passed before the diversion was put in place, hundreds of the 14,000 concert goers would likely have passed through the City Room doors, encountering a scene of horror. There would have been large numbers of first-hand eyewitness reports of the scene, not to mention photographs all over social media. But instead there was nothing apart from the Barr footage and the Parker photograph.

According to the Inquiry report, SMG Events Manager Miriam Stone “instructed Thomas Rigby, the Showsec Head of Security, to close the City Room” after her CCTV monitor had gone white “for a few seconds” and then, as the smoke cleared, revealed what she called a “scene of devastation and carnage” (§16.122-6.123). This, followed by Rigby radioing Showsec staff, followed by the time it took for them to close the City Room, would have taken at least half a minute and probably longer.

Large numbers of people would have passed through the doors in that time. Remember how busy the scene was during egress, shown below officially one second before detonation:

Source: Richplanet.net

In under a minute, with the doors wide open, dozens of people would have entered the City Room, and there would have been plenty of first-hand reports, photographs, and videos of the scene put out into the public domain. That is just how things work in the age of cameraphones and social media.

In sum, the claim that the City Room exit was sealed off after the detonation of a TATP shrapnel bomb does not match the available evidence.

Were Armed Police Immediately On Site?

The Inquiry report and the Kerslake Report claim that the first armed officers arrived on site at 22:43, with CCTV imagery showing two firearms officers entering Victoria Station at 22:42:52:

Armed officers arrive at 22:42:52. Source: Richplanet.net

According to the Inquiry report, a “spiky bubble” was created around the City Room between 22:48 and 22:50, which “resulted in firearms protection on the Arena side of the City Room and the railway station side of the City Room” (§10.86).

Hall, however, suspects that armed police were on site within a minute of the bang. In 2019, he received correspondence from someone who had interviewed a roadie who was present at the Arena on May 22, 2017. The roadie’s statement was as follows:

When the concert ended and we walked onto the stage to start taking the drum kit down, heard a bang which we thought was just a flight case falling over, and then the stage manager’s radio started going ballistic, and he just went. And there was panic there was pandemonium in the arena. No-one knew what had gone on, and the stage manager said ‘right everyone out of the building’. As you come off the stage of the arena, probably a 50 yard walk to the loading bay and then out to the back staff entrance, so it would take what a minute, and as we come out of the loading bay there was 8 armed police come running past which is where I think they had some sort of intelligence about this cos the armed response were that quick. For coming off the stage to get to there, there’s 8 armed plod coming in so they must have knew something. ” (§4.10.6)

Hall adds (§4.10.6) that this unofficial source is corroborated by Darron Coster, who told the Inquiry that, while at the foot of the stairs to the footbridge in Manchester Victoria station, he heard a “loud bang” and saw a “little flash of dust and light” coming from the City Room, which he walked towards as evacuees came in the opposite direction (§16.181).

Some time between 22:32 and 22:34, Coster received a text message from his son confirming that he was safe. That timing is omitted from the Inquiry report (§16.181). However, when Saunders asked Coster about the timing at the Inquiry, Coster replied that he received the message after entering the City Room.

Coster immediately shut the City Room doors. This means the doors were closed no later than 22:34 and possibly before 22:32.

Coster told the Inquiry:

I’d just closed the doors and as I got to the last door there were two armed officers there, that appeared. They were still […] establishing communications, and I said something silly like, if you need a mobile phone I’ve got one.

Therefore, from Coster’s account, armed police were in the City Room no later than 22:34 and possibly before 22:32. This information is omitted from the Inquiry report.

Given Hall’s evidence that the detonation may have occurred 30 seconds after the official time of 22:31:00 (§4.13), it is possible that armed police were on site within a minute.

The role of the armed police may not have been purely protective and benign. ETUK’s Ian Parry, for instance, in his witness statement given to the Kerslake Inquiry, spoke of (from the transcription notes)

so many armed police “telling you to fuck off and holding gun to head.” Couldn’t go out for more gear [...] One officer said tell us what you want, we’ll get it… not practical… wanted to go ourselves. (2:12:19)

This adds to the impression of a highly controlled environment, indeed almost a hostage environment.

What Happened After the Critical Period of Response?

The Inquiry report defines the “critical period of response” as “the time from the explosion to the removal of the final living casualty from the City Room: 22:31 to 23:39 [when the final casualty was evacuated from the City Room]” (§10.9). The report has little to say about what took place after 23:39.

Nevertheless, some interesting questions arise. For example, given that all casualties had been evacuated by that 23:39, why were “a large number” of BTP officers still present in the City Room at 23:43:35? Were they being debriefed, or perhaps given a stern warning that what they had witnessed was to remain classified, before being ordered out of the room?

Source: Richplanet.net

Similarly with the Emergency Training UK staff, nine out of ten can be seen exiting together at 23:51:31. This was 12 minutes after the last casualty had been evacuated from the City Room. Did ETUK receive a separate debrief/warning after BTP (37:27)?

Nine out of ten ETUK staff simultaneously depart the scene. Source: Richplanet.net

What happened to the Showsec staff? When did they depart the scene and under what circumstances? We do not know, because there is no evidence relating to this in either the CCTV footage or the Inquiry report. The last CCTV image showing Showsec personnel is at 22:46:04. The report makes no mention of Mohammad Agha or Kyle Lawler in the post-detonation period. It states that other Showsec staff assisted casualties in the City Room, but no corroborating evidence has been presented to the public.

No Attempt To Preserve The Crime Scene

The BTP Crime Scene Examiner (unnamed) is seen on CCTV to have arrived and entered the City Room just after 23:58:41 and to have exited again at 00:01:17. The BTP Crime Scene Examiner thus spent no more than two and a half minutes at the crime scene as far as we know.

Source: Richplanet.net

The last publicly available CCTV image from the City Room is time-stamped 00:58:47. Hall assembled two composite images, from two of the three CCTV cameras in that room, covering the post-detonation period:

Source: Hall, Manchester on Camera (48:30)

There are no obvious crime scene markings in these composite images: no taped off areas, no markings on the floor, no crime scene photographers, etc. (cf. Davis, 2024, p. 279). Do we see anything other than people in dark clothing and high visibility jackets standing in a clean empty space?

Why did Saunders, despite claiming that “this does seem to be remarkably good quality CCTV” (01:38:50), rely on grainy CCTV and body-worn camera footage (p. iii) instead of high resolution crime scene photographs? Is it because none exist, or at least only ones that show tampered evidence (see below)?

GMP firearms officers at that time were not equipped with body-worn cameras (§13.315). Not all, but “several” unarmed officers had body-worn cameras (§13.314). It would, therefore, be interesting to know how many, and which, officers in the City Room were wearing body-worn cameras. In other words, where exactly was Saunders getting his evidence from in terms of body-worn camera footage?

According to the summary of footage for the final CCTV image from the City Room, a “large group of officers” entered at or around 00:58:47 and formed “a long line”:

Source: Richplanet.net

Who were those officers? Where had they been previously? What was their purpose?

According to Hall, “at 1:19 the crime scene was closed down and taken over by Counter Terrorism” (§4.11). It is unclear where Hall has got the 01:19 time from. Did Counter Terrorism take over at 00:58?

Fabricating a Crime Scene?

If those present in the City Room were not seeking to preserve the crime scene, were they instead seeking to fabricate one? For example, were the night-time hours of the morning of May 23, 2017, when the damage was caused to the hospitality suite doors that Operation Manteline later provided to the Inquiry (see Davis’s analysis in Part 2)?

Until very recently, this would have been a matter of mere speculation. However, owing to new research by the pseudonymous Pighooey, we can know for a fact that at least some of the damage to the building was caused after the Barr footage was taken at ca. 22:35 on May 22, 2017, but before the daylight hours of May 23, 2017.

Pighooey draws attention to the marks on the wall in this photograph taken on May 23, 2017:

She provides a close-up and a negative for contrast enhancement:

A video from GMP’s Operation Manteline shows the same marks in the wall (as Pighooey proves through more detailed analysis in her video):

In the Barr footage, however, there are no marks on the wall on either occasion that it appears:

Therefore, we must conclude that the marks to the wall were caused after the bang but before sunrise. It is, therefore, highly likely that they were caused after Counter Terrorism took control of the area.

In which case, what are we to understand by the idea of “Counter Terrorism”? What exactly is being countered? Who are the terrorists?

Who Was Behind The “Attack”?

If not Salman Abedi — and the forensic evidence is inconsistent with a suicide bomber exploding a TATP shrapnel bomb — then who was responsible for the event that caused 14,000 concert goers to flee the Arena in panic?

Prosecution barrister Price tried trapping Hall into a simplistic claim that it was “the government” that was to blame. Hall did not take Price’s bait:

Mr Price: Your theory is that the government, with one mind, has planned and orchestrated a giant fake bomb involving hundreds of actors, to justify policy which it has been democratically elected to enact.

Mr Hall: No, that is not true. I would take issue with the word government, because the word government is, needs to be explored. This, it is my belief, is done by a faction of the State, which […] largely […] escapes democratic control, elements within the Security Services, for example. […S]o, when I am using the word government there, […] I do not mean MPs in parliament or even people in the cabinet, I mean elements within the State that do not have proper democratic oversight.

This is very important to understand. When the truth about Operation Gladio — the Italian wing of a clandestine transnational NATO operation that engaged in false flag terrorism against innocent civilians — emerged in the 1990s, one of the astonishing revelations was that nearly all politicians knew nothing about it:

Most remarkable about the Italian Strategy of Tension is that it left “at most only one or two government officials actually aware of the existence of the program” (Ahmed, 2012, p. 68). Elected politicians and government officials remained both blind and without operational command, evidencing “another form of government, hidden from both the public and many within the political establishment, that was operating beyond the rule of law, without democratic oversight or control. A ‘Deep State’” (Davis, 2018). (Hughes, 2024, p. 95)

Price’s cross-examination of Hall continued:

Mr Price: Are [...] these elements people?

Mr Hall: Well, they contain people, yes.

Mr Price: Have you identified them?

Mr Hall: Well, I have identified Counter Terrorism’s potential involvement, and there are people within Counter Terrorism that I have named as potentially being involved in the orchestration of the hoax, and also at the public enquiry. My opinion is that they were not the ultimate planners or […] organisers of it. My opinion is that they were State assets running this operation.

Mr Price: On behalf of?

Mr Hall: On behalf of elements within the government which remain free from democratic oversight, such as Security Services.

In his evidence, Hall asserted the following:

I believe the operation was planned and co-ordinated by a national government agency, and orchestrated at a local level by the counter terror department at [G]reater Manchester [P]olice headquarters. I believe that counter terror used their liaison officer [Ken Upham] to set up the event and recruit a number of staff at the arena who also played roles on the night. (§5.0)

Although the specifics remain unproven, the broader logic is plausible.

Motives for a Staged Attack

In his first witness statement, Hall was very clear about potential motives for a staged attack:

Multiple motives underpin this orchestrated event. It served to tighten public control and facilitated the passing of legislation like Martyn's Law. Furthermore, it bolstered security service budgets and justified heightened military actions in Libya. The incident also played into President Trump's efforts to impose travel bans, particularly on Muslim-majority countries, bolstered by the narrative surrounding the Manchester incident.” [3]

Martyn’s Law, named after Manchester victim Martyn Hett, is the colloquial name for the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill, introduced to Parliament on September 12, 2024. Under the guise of “public protection,” the Bill essentially proposes to expand the kinds of airport-style security measures that were introduced after “9/11” to public event venues with a capacity of either 200-799 or 800+ people. Two conspicuous elements proposed are “invacuation” (safe entry) and “lockdown” measures. Consistent with the “Covid-19” era, we see the relentless “securitizing” of society, with the public subjected to increasingly draconian measures, even to enjoy a concert or sporting event. It is not difficult to envisage a digital ID — the gateway to technocracy — as a necessary requirement to meet the “invacuation” measures.

In terms of heightened military actions in Libya, deaths from US air strikes significantly intensified in 2017, as the chart below shows.

Source: New America

Propaganda about evil Libyan terrorists targeting Western children with a TATP shrapnel bomb undoubtedly served to legitimise increased military action in Libya in the eyes of the public. Trump’s call to ban entry to the United States from seven Muslim-majority countries served a similar propaganda function, making Muslims out to be a threat while the United States and its allies meddled in the affairs of one Muslim-majority country after another.

Such, indeed, has been the modus operandi for the entire “War on Terror” since “9/11,” creating Muslim patsies to sell the public stories of “Islamist terrorism,” on the basis of which increasingly draconian measures were introduced at home while imperialist wars of aggression were waged abroad. That war of deception has been, as much as anything else, a war against freedom and democracy in the West, perversely waged in the name of protecting freedom and democracy.

The “Leak”

Further evidence that the intelligence operations behind the Manchester Arena incident extend beyond the UK concerns the apparent leaking of police photographs taken at the crime scene to the New York Times. In keeping with GMP Inspector Michael Smith’s demonstrably false claim over police radio communications (see Part 11), the Times placed the location of Abedi’s torso on the Arena concourse:

Source: New York Times

A diplomatic spat ensued as Prime Minister Theresa May, Home Secretary Amber Rudd, and UK National Counter Terrorism Policing all expressed their displeasure at the “leak.” But as Davis (2024, p. 237) points out,

It appeared the “leak” could only have come from UK investigators at the scene—unless US intelligence agencies were involved and were the source of the “leak.”

Indeed, it seems hard to see how this information could have leaked from Greater Manchester Police to the New York Times in under 36 hours unless it had been deliberately passed on by British intelligence, to add to the “authenticity” of the attack in public consciousness. Whether this was orchestrated by US or British intelligence is a moot point, since the two are essentially one and the same when it comes to NATO false flag terrorism dating at least as far back as Operation Gladio.

Conclusion

There are legitimate reasons to suspect that whatever took place inside the City Room on May 22, 2017, was an operation instigated by the security services, probably MI5.

The across-the-board failures in the senior command posts of all four emergency services do not make sense without some kind of stand down orders having been issued under the Official Secrets Act.

Counter Terrorism’s Ken Upham, line managed by Liz Forster, organised several terror exercises at the Manchester Arena prior to May 22, 2017. A 2014 exercise involved the scenario of a terrorist attack in the City Room.

The parallels between Exercise Winchester Accord and the Manchester Arena incident are too numerous and too specific to be accidental.

The Barr footage and the Parker photograph provide compelling evidence that what took place was an exercise.

There is evidence that the City Room was a controlled space on the night. Access from the Arena concourse appears to have been blocked before detonation, and there is evidence that armed police were on site almost immediately.

Following the period of critical response, BTP and ETUK staff may have been debriefed before being ordered out of the City Room. Instead of trying to preserve the crime scene, one was instead fabricated.

It was not “the government” that was to blame. Rather, a hidden, shadowy network operating beyond democratic accountability appears to have orchestrated the event.

This is what I refer to as the transnational deep state, centred primarily on the United States and the UK. Its goal is to destroy freedom and democracy in the West through a rolling series of psychological operations. In that sense, Davis (2024, p. 323) is correct that “The ‘Manchester Attack’ was not a suicide bombing in the Manchester Arena. It was an assault on the psyche of the nation.”

As the public starts to recover from that assault, and begins to look seriously at the evidence Hall adduced, it is clear that the perpetrators are running scared. The orchestrated persecution of Hall is one sure sign. Another is UK Counter Terrorism’s current efforts to scrub the Barr footage from the internet:

The John Barr video, uploaded to Odysee on November 19, 2024, and blocked by UK Counter Terrorism by the New Year. Source: Odysee

Presumably, this kind of censorship will soon extend to all corners of the Internet, which is why it is very important that Hall’s evidence is spread far and wide, so that people can make their own minds up.

There is much more to be said about what took place inside the City Room if we are indeed looking at an intelligence operation. In Part 11, I will look at some specific individuals whom Hall suspects may have been operatives.